Antonio Taguba and His Report, May 2004

In March 2004, General Antonio Taguba was assigned to investigate the alleged abuses at Abu Ghraib. Although many top presidential administration officials, including Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, denied having any knowledge of the abuse prior to the release of the report. However, Taguba's report showed that the commands for the abuse had to have been handed down from top military commanders.

The report was supposed to have been kept classified, but was somehow leaked to the media through a senior military official. It pointed to the President and his staff for ordering the MPs guarding the detainees to employ any means necessary, and any extent of abuse to gain intelligence from the prisoners regarding terrorism. Although Rumsfeld and many commanding officers denied seeing any of the photos of abuse before the release of the report, Taguba felt that many of them had indeed seen the pictures, and had knowledge of the extent of the torture, but made no attempt to stop them or inform the President or the appropriate Senate committee of the activities.

After Taguba's report was released, he was ostracized by military officials and the Presidential administration. A couple of months later, he was demoted to an inferior position in a low-ranking office at the Pentagon, essentially so that officials could keep an eye on him. Knowing that his career was at a dead-end, Taguba retired shortly after. Although military officials ignored him after he authored the report, Taguba has been heralded by many as a pioneer for telling the truth about the extent of the abuse, knowing that his career and military future were on the line. Summed up best in his own words, "If I lie, I lose. And, if I tell the truth, I lose."

Exposure of the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal

Joseph Darby, a member of the 372nd Brigade, asked his fellow soldier Lt. Graner for copies of any pictures he had taken while they were touring Iraq. Graner gave Darby 2 CDs with photos on them, and just asked that they be returned after Darby had used them. What Darby found shocked and disgusted him. He gave the photographic evidence of the abuse of the prisoners to CID (military investigators), and was soon questioned about the pictures he had discovered. An internal investigation soon followed, and MPs were told if they had any photos, CDs, DVDs or contraband, they could place it in amnesty boxes and the evidence would be forgotten. In other words, they would face no consequences or punishment for anything they willingly turned over to CID.

Soon, the television show 60 Minutes II and the magazine The New Yorker made the story and pictures national news. Although Darby was promised anonymity, Secretary Rumsfeld thanked him on national television for alerting the CID to the abuse. There was worldwide outrage and anger that American soldiers had inflicted this abuse onto Iraqi prisoners. Military officials, and the presidential administration insisted that this was the work of a "few bad soldiers," and that as a nation, we ought not let the actions of these 7 soldiers define us as a whole. They also repeated that these soldiers were never given orders to inflict this abuse, and there were no direct links between commanding military officers and the torture performed.

However, critics argue that these soldiers could not have done this, or come up with these sadist ideas of torture on their own account. In fact, for presidential administration and military officials to entertain this idea is direct denial and naivete of the lack of management at Abu Ghraib. The techniques that they used were very specific interrogation techniques, and had previously been used by American military at Guantanamo and developed by Brazilian interrogators. These soldiers could not have just conjured up these torture positions with their own imaginations.

The mismanagement, and lack of checks and balances by the multiple agencies of the United States led to the Abu Ghraib scandal. The photographs that emerged embarassed the U.S. military system, and discredited the nation as a whole. The country that was once viewed as one of the most humanitarian and just countries of the world, was now viewed as torturous and capable of inflicting severe pain upon other human beings. Essentially, we become the terrorists we are fighting against.

What Happened at Abu Ghraib?

Soon enough, some of the prison guards starting taking advantage of the power they had been given. During the fall of 2003, a few of the night shift prison guards took pictures with a digital camera of several abuse and torture sessions.

Soon after, a prison-wide riot broke out among the detainees. This only angered the prison guards more, and caused them to unleash their fury through abuse on the prisoners who started the riot. Told that the tortured prisoners would be interrogated to find the instigators of the prison riots, the guards took the abuse techniques to an all-time high, and took as many pictures as possible of the humiliated prisoners.

Although the MPs soon "softened up" on the inmates, the interrogations themselves became more dangerous. Inmates would come back from the interrogation booth battered, bruised and barely breathing from the beatings they had endured. Although deaths resulted from the beatings, only one was ruled a homicide. However, only the two MPs who photographed themselves with the dead body had charges brought against them. The civilian contractors who actually caused the death faced no legal punishment.

Military Police Moved from Incarceration Staff & Placed Under Military Intelligence (MI)

After Maj. Gen. Miller's in visit in September 2003, the Military Police were removed from Gen. Kapinski's control and placed under the direction of Military Intelligence. This removed the MPs from the incarceration staff, and placed them in the category of interrogation staff, thus giving them the responsibility of getting the prisoners ready for military interrogators. Since the role of interrogators was subcontracted out to civilian entities, like the CIA, the members of these organizations were not subject to answering to the same moral obglations as members of the Military Police. The MPs were now ordered to torture and abuse the prisoners of Abu Ghraib.

Maj. Gen. Geoffrey Miller, Donald Rumsfeld, Ricardo Sanchez & Interrogation Techniques

Donald Rumsfeld liked Major General Geoffrey Miller because his chief concern was to get results from the detainees he questioned for intelligence. His harsh interrogation techniques at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba helped him to gain inside intelligence from the prisoners held there. Although rumors of prisoner abuse had plagued Miller's term as head of prison operations, the presidential administration backed up his reiterations that prisoners were treated humanely. However, critics and others disagreed.

Many FBI officials had visited Guantanamo Bay, and had written about their observations of extreme torture and abuse of prisoners. Once these official government documents leaked, the Bush administration acknowledged that Rumsfeld had approved such techniques. The techniques that Rumsfeld approved included forced nudity, exposure to extreme light, darkness, heat or coldness, sexual humiliation and intimidation by dogs, among many others. In August 2003, just 8 short months after Rumsfeld allowed Miller to use harsher interrogation techniques at Guantanamo, he sent the Major General to Iraq to help the interrogation situation there. Officially, the Presidential Administration said that the Geneva Conventions applied to Abu Ghraib. What happened off the record was a completely different story. 

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld tours 

Abu Ghraib with Maj. Gen. Miller

Maj. Gen. Miller suggested the implementation of harsher techniques at Abu Ghraib to pull intelligence from detainees. After Maj. Gen. Miller's visit, Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez, head of all military operations in Iraq, issued a memorandum that approved extreme interrogation techniques for prisoners in Iraq. A month later, Sanchez withdrew some of the techniques he had just approved. With the policies changing back and forth so quickly, many soldiers became confused about which techniques could and couldn't be used against the prisoners. Much like the techniques used at Guantanamo, forced nudity, sexual humiliation, intimidation by dogs and prolonged standing were used. The prisoners were made to wear sand bags over their head so that they were unaware of what or who was around them. Many were handcuffed to bars and windows, naked and backwards, and made to stand there for days until they gave up scraps of intelligence. The problem was many of the prisoners had no terroristic intelligence. 

The "Hard Site" & the Failure of "Intelligence" at Abu Ghraib

The prisoners at Abu Ghraib were divided according to their danger level. Tier 1A, or the "hard sites" held the prisoners believed to be harboring evidence, or the criminally insane, while the inner most protected areas, Tier 1B, held the women and children. The women and children were used as leverage against the prisoners whom the guards thought had intelligence that could help the U.S. military.

Because of the sheer lack in numbers of guards compared to the number of prisoners detained in Tier 1A, there were often 6-7 guards monitoring over 1,000 prisoners. Many of the prisoners within the hard sites were members of al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorists organizations. At any time, if all of the prisoners worked together, they could have staged an upheaval that would have left the guards dead. Because of the constant influx of prisoners arriving at Abu Ghraib, the intelligence officers were overwhelmed by the high number of prisoners that needed to be interviewed. They soon found that many of the detainees brought to the prison were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time, and had no inside intelligence regarding terrorism. 

The U.S. military, and particularly the Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, began to get aggravated at the lack of intelligence being gathered from the prisoners. Late in the summer of 2003, an intelligence meeting was held at the Pentagon. Secretary Rumsfeld questioned the lack of intelligence gathered in Iraq, and ordered that General Miller, head of prison operations at Guantanamo Bay, be flown to Iraq to get a handle on the situation. 

Major General Geoffrey Miller

The Location, Atmosphere & Situation at Abu Ghraib by Sept. 2003

When the 372nd Military Police Company arrived at Abu Ghraib prison in September of 2003, the conditions within the prison were deplorable. Painted with pictures of Hussein, and remains of human bodies scattered around, the soldiers stationed there were less than eager to be in charge of watching and regulation the prisoners detained there. Described as "a desert bowl of misery," the heat index could reach over 130 degrees. The smell of sweat, feces, urine and decay ran rampant, and the prison could go days without electricity or running water.

Abu Ghraib prison

Former Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, commander of U.S. military detention operations, says that resources and back-up were requested numerous times, not only at Abu Ghraib, but at other prison facilities also. The 372nd MP company was trained to support combat operations, not act as prison guards for thousands of Iraqi citizens. They had received no training in corrections, and upon learning that this would be their mission, their morale plummeted. The prison was the most attacked U.S. position in Iraq, and was positioned next to the most dangerous road in Iraq.

Throughout July and August 2003, the prison only held about 1,000 prisoners and the atmosphere was fairly stable. However, due to mass round-ups and slow releases, the population soared to over 6, 000 by the end of September. With less than 300 MPs, the ratio was 20:1. The lack of management, security and manpower would lead to crisis and scandal that would plague the 372nd MP Company, and destroy the credibility of the American Army. 

Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib